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How do households distribute themselves in a spatial dimension?  Do they distribute 
themselves efficiently?  What determines land use patterns?  Standard intermediate 
microeconomic theory is ill-equipped to answer these questions because households and 
others using land care about the location, as well as the quantity, of land that they 
consume.  As a result, some of the standard assumptions used in our models lead to 
predictions that are inconsistent with observed behavior.  For example, suppose that 
households like to consume land and a composite consumption good (a bundle of 
everything that is not land).  A key assumption in standard microeconomic theory is that 
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preferences are strictly convex, which implies under symmetry of preferences that 
households prefer owning an acre of land and a unit of composite good to owning two 
acres of land and no composite good or to owning two units of composite good and no 
land, all else being equal.  However, if households care about the location of the land 
they consume, then “land in the city” and “land in the suburbs” are essentially two 
different goods.  In this case, convex preferences and symmetry imply that households 
prefer owning one acre of land in the city and one acre of land in the suburbs to owning 
two acres of land in the city and none in the suburbs and to owning two acres of land in 
the suburbs and none in the city.  In general, households will want to diversify their 
landholdings.  This is inconsistent with observed behavior. 
To answer the questions we posed, we turn to the Alonso (1964) model, and rely 
on Berliant and Fujita (1992) for an analysis of it.  This model is a straightforward 
extension of standard microeconomic theory to urban economics that includes land as a 
commodity while at the same time incorporating differences between land at different 
locations in a natural way.  In this model, a finite number of identical households live in a 
long, narrow (one dimensional) city.  They like to consume a composite consumption 
good and land.  In particular, households consume parcels or intervals of land.  They 
simultaneously choose how much composite good and land to consume and the location 
of their parcel.  Households commute from the land they consume to an exogenously 
determined location, the city center or central business district, in order to receive their 
endowment of composite good.  Commuting is costly, so they care about the location of 
their parcel of land because the cost of commuting between it and the central business 
district varies with the distance between the two.  The Alonso model is distinguished   3
from other models of urban economics by the following two features:  (1) The use of a 
finite number of households (two in this article) instead of a continuum, and (2) the 
assumption that households like intervals of land in one dimension. 
We begin with a brief review of the tools and definitions used in standard 
microeconomic theory.  Next, we introduce the Alonso model.  We follow this 
introduction with an extension of the standard tools and definitions for this model.  We 
then provide a specific example of the model to illustrate how two identical households 
divide up the available land in a long, narrow city.  We conclude with comments on 
extensions of the basic Alonso model. 
 
A Brief Review Of Intermediate Microeconomic Theory 
  We begin with an exchange economy populated by two households, A and B, 
who like to consume two goods, 1 and 2.  Household i’s consumption of good j is 
i
j x .  
Note that we use superscripts to identify households and subscripts to identify goods.  
Households’ preferences over different consumption bundles, or different combinations 
of goods 1 and 2, are represented by utility functions.  The utility function for household i 
is  R R U
i →
2 : , where  ) , ( 2 1
i i i x x U  is the level of utility household i enjoys when it 
consumes the bundle  ) , ( 2 1
i i x x .  Preferences are convex if, for all possible consumption 
bundles ) , ( 2 1
i i x x  and  ) ˆ , ˆ ( 2 1
i i x x , ) ˆ , ˆ ( ) , ( 2 1 2 1
i i i i i i x x U x x U =  implies that for all  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ α , 
) , ( ) ˆ ) 1 ( , ˆ ) 1 ( ( 2 1 2 2 1 1
i i i i i i i i x x U x x x x U ≥ − + − + α α α α .  In other words, consuming a linear 
combination of two bundles that both generate the same level of utility does not diminish 
utility.  An indifference curve is a collection of consumption bundles that generate the 
same level of utility for a household.  Thus, a household is indifferent between all the   4
consumption bundles that make up an indifference curve.  Figure 1 illustrates an 
indifference curve, 
i
U IC , where  } ) , ( | ) , {( 2 1 2 1 U x x U x x IC
i i i i i i
U = =  is the set of bundles that 




2 : , where  ) , ( 2 1
i i i
j x x MU  is the additional utility household i would get if it 
consumed an additional unit of good j, given that it is consuming the bundle  ) , ( 2 1
i i x x  and 
maintaining utility level U .  The marginal utility of good j is the derivative of household 














2 1 . 
Household i’s marginal rate of substitution of good 1 for good 2 is  R R MRS
i →
2










2 1 2 , 1 ) , ( =  
identifies how much of good 2 household i is willing to give up in order to get one more 
unit of good 1, given that it is consuming the bundle  ) , ( 2 1
i i x x .  Figure 1 shows that 
) ˆ , ˆ ( 2 1 2 , 1
i i i x x MRS  is the slope of household i’s indifference curve at the bundle  ) ˆ , ˆ ( 2 1
i i x x .  
Household i’s endowment of good j is 
i
j ω .  An allocation is a list of consumption 
bundles for each household:  ) , , , ( 2 1 2 1
B B A A x x x x .  An allocation is feasible if there is material 
balance in both goods, 
B A B A x x 1 1 1 1 ω ω + = +  and 
B A B A x x 2 2 2 2 ω ω + = + .  The set of feasible 
allocations are those contained in the standard Edgeworth box, illustrated in Figure 2.  
The width of the box is the total quantity of good 1 available in the economy, 
B A
1 1 ω ω + .  
The height of the box is the total quantity of good 2 available in the economy, 
B A
2 2 ω ω + .    5
Household A’s origin is the point (0,0), and household B’s origin is the point 
) , ( 2 2 1 1
B A B A ω ω ω ω + + .  A feasible allocation is Pareto optimal, or is efficient, if there is no 
other feasible allocation that keeps every household at least as well off and makes some 
household better off.  We can use marginal rates of substitution to characterize the set of 
Pareto optimal allocations:  If the feasible allocation  ) , , , ( 2 1 2 1
B B A A x x x x  is Pareto optimal, 
then  ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 2 , 1 2 1 2 , 1
B B B A A A x x MRS x x MRS = , and if preferences are convex, then 
) , ( ) , ( 2 1 2 , 1 2 1 2 , 1
B B B A A A x x MRS x x MRS =  implies that  ) , , , ( 2 1 2 1
B B A A x x x x  is Pareto optimal, provided 
that it is feasible.  (Please note that we are skipping some technical assumptions and 
details here.)  Loosely speaking, the set of Pareto optimal allocations, or the contract 
curve, is the set of allocations in the Edgeworth box at which households’ indifference 
curves are tangent to each other.  The intuition, illustrated in Figure 2, is that if the 
marginal rates of substitution for the two households are unequal at an allocation, such as 









B B A A x x x x , then there are unexhausted gains from trade and the allocation is not 
efficient.  Moreover, if the marginal rates of substitution at an allocation such as 
) , , , ( 2 1 2 1
B B A A x x x x  are equal, then the set of allocations that would make one household 
better off is disjoint from the set of allocations that would make the other household 
better off, so there is no way to make one household better off without making the other 
household worse off.  Note that finding and characterizing the set of Pareto optimal 
allocations – the set of “best” allocations – is a normative exercise that says nothing 
about the quantities of goods each household will actually consume. 
  To find the actual distribution of goods across households, we use the concept of 
competitive equilibrium, a positive concept.  Let good 2 be the numeraire, so  1 2 = p .  A   6









B B A A x x x x  and a price 
*
1 p  such 
that 
1.  Household A maximizes its utility  ) , ( 2 1
A A A x x U  subject to its budget constraint, 




1 ω ω + ≤ + , and 
2.  Household B maximizes its utility  ) , ( 2 1
B B B x x U  subject to its budget constraint, 




1 ω ω + ≤ + , 
at 








1 1 , , , = = = = .  An equilibrium allocation is an allocation 









B B A A x x x x  such that there exists a price 
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B B A A x x x x  and 
*
1 p  
an equilibrium.  Competitive equilibrium is a positive concept that helps understand how 
resources will be allocated using the price mechanism in a decentralized setting with no 
coordination between the households.  Skipping further technicalities and assuming that 
households exhaust their budgets, the conditions equivalent to equilibrium are that each 







1 2 , 1
p
x x MRS
i i i = , 








j x x ω ω + = +
* * . 
Figure 1 shows that if the first condition is not satisfied for some household i, then there 
exists an affordable consumption bundle that makes that household better off, so 
household i is not maximizing its utility subject to its budget.  The budget line is the set 
of bundles  ) , ( 2 1
i i x x  such that 




1 ω ω + = + .  The slope of the budget line is 
*
1 p − .    7
The bundle  ) ˆ , ˆ ( 2 1
i i x x  is affordable, but 
*
1 2 1 ) ˆ , ˆ ( p x x MRS












1 2 , 1 ) , ( p x x MRS
i i i = , is also affordable and generates more utility than  ) ˆ , ˆ ( 2 1
i i x x . 
  The welfare theorems provide the connection between equilibrium allocations, a 
positive idea, and Pareto optimal allocations, a normative idea, in this simple model.  The 
First Welfare Theorem states that under certain conditions every equilibrium allocation is 
Pareto optimal.  The Second Welfare Theorem states that if preferences are convex and it 
is possible to redistribute endowments, then under certain technical assumptions every 
Pareto optimal allocation is an equilibrium allocation for some set of endowments. 
  For a more thorough discussion of the topics reviewed in this section, see, for 
example, Varian (1993).    
 
The Alonso Model 
The Alonso model adds space to the basic framework we just described.  Our two 
households, A and B, now live in a long, narrow city of length l.  The interval from 0 to l 
describes the length of the city.  See Figure 3.  Households consume a composite good 
and land.  The quantity of composite good consumed by household i is 
i z , the location of 
the driveway or the front of the lot occupied by household i is  ) , 0 [ l x
i ∈ , and the quantity 
of land consumed or length of the lot occupied by household i is 
i s .  Thus, household i 
owns the interval  ) , [
i i i s x x + .  There are C units of composite good available in the 
economy.  Households must commute to the city center, located at the origin, in order to 
pick up their endowment of composite good.  In doing so, households incur a cost of t 
units of composite good per unit distance they travel, measured from the front of their lot.  
Households A and B have the same utility function,  ) , ( z s U , where U is increasing in   8
both of its arguments and land is a normal good.  Recall that a good is normal if 
households consume more of it when their income increases, all else being equal.  Let 
) , (
i i i z s U U = .  Since both households have the same utility function, we can say how 
well off one household is relative to the other.  An allocation is a list specifying 
quantities of land consumed, quantities of composite good consumed, and driveway 
locations for both households:  ) , , , , , (
B A B A B A x x z z s s .  Thus,  0 , , , >
B A B A z z s s  and 
) , 0 [ , l x x
B A ∈ .  An allocation is feasible if material balance is satisfied for both the 
composite good and land, namely  
C tx tx z z
B A B A = + + + ,  
0 ) , [ ) , [ / = + ∩ +
B B B A A A s x x s x x ,  
and  
) , 0 [ ) , [ ) , [ l s x x s x x
B B B A A A = + ∪ + . 
 
Pareto Optimal Allocations And The Contract Curve 
A feasible allocation is a Pareto optimum, or is efficient, if there is no other 
feasible allocation that keeps every household at least as well off and makes some 
household better off.  What do Pareto optima look like?  Consider a feasible allocation, 
) , , , , , (
B A B A B A x x z z s s , where  0 =
A x  and 
B A s s > .  In this case, household A lives closest 
to the city center and occupies a lot that is larger than the lot occupied by household B.  
Household A’s commuting cost is zero, household B’s commuting cost is 
A B ts tx = , and  
C tx z z
B B A = + + .   This allocation is not a Pareto optimum because there exists another 
feasible allocation that makes at least one household better off without making the other   9
household worse off.  For example, consider a feasible allocation  ) ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ (
B A B A B A x x z z s s , 
where households switch positions but consume the quantity of land given in the original 
assignment, so 
A A s s = ˆ , and 
B B s s = ˆ .  Household B consumes the same quantity of 
composite good, so 
B B z z = ˆ , and household B lives closest to the city center, so  0 ˆ =
B x  
and 
B A s x = ˆ .  Please refer to Figure 4, which shows how the two allocations are related.  
Household B’s commuting cost is now zero and household A’s commuting cost is now 
B A ts x t = ˆ .  Since household A lives on a larger lot than household B, 
B A B A tx ts ts x t = < = ˆ .  This allocation is feasible: 
B A B B B A A z ts C z ts C z x t C z − − > − − = − − = ˆ ˆ ˆ . 
Thus, household B is just as well off as it was with bundle  ) , (
B B z s , and household A is 
better off because it is consuming the same amount of land and more composite good.  
Generalizing this intuition leads to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 (Berliant and Fujita 1992):  If  ) , , , , , (
B A B A B A x x z z s s
D D D D D D  is a Pareto 
optimum, then 
1. 
B A x x
D D <  exactly when 
B A s s
D D < , so household A lives closest to the city center 
if and only if it occupies a smaller lot, 
2. 
B A x x
D D <  implies that 
B A U U ≤ , so if household A lives closest to the city center, 
then household B is at least as well off as household A, and 
3. 
B A U U <  implies that 
B A x x
D D < , so if household B is strictly better off than 
household A, then household A lives closest to the city center. 
   10
Pareto optima fall into one of two categories: (1) those in which household A 
lives closest to the city center and (2) those in which household B lives closest to the city 
center.  The contract curve is the union of these two sets of Pareto optima.  We can 
portray the contract curve using an Edgeworth box modified to account for the amount of 
composite good used up in commuting, where the modification will depend on which 
household lives closest to the city center. 
When household A lives closest to the city center, we modify the box as 
illustrated in Figure 5.  Household A’s origin is the lower left corner of the box.  The 
bottom of the box is simply the line segment  ] , 0 [ l .  The height of the left side of the box 
is the total amount of composite good available, C.  The top of the box is a line that 
identifies how much composite good remains to be divided between households A and B 
after household B commutes to the city center.  The distance household B commutes is 
equal to the length of household A’s lot, 
A s .  Thus, the top of the box is the line 
A ts C − .  
Finally, household B’s origin is the point  ) , ( tl C l − , where  tl C −  is the amount of 
composite good that remains if  l s
A =  and household B commutes the entire length of the 
city.  Since the top of the box has “rotated down” by 
A ts , household B’s indifference 
curves must also be “rotated down” the same way.  Household A’s indifference curves 
are unchanged.  A point in this modified Edgeworth box identifies a feasible allocation in 
which household A lives closest to the city center, so 
A x  is at the city center, 0.  The 
quantity of land consumed by household A, 
A s , is measured by the horizontal distance 
from the origin.  The driveway of household B, 
B x , is at 
A s + 0 .  The quantity of land 
consumed by household B, 
B s , is 
A s l − .  The quantity of composite good consumed by 
household A, zA, is the vertical distance from the bottom of the box, and the quantity of   11
composite good consumed by household B is the vertical distance from the modified top 
of the box, 
A ts C − . 
Suppose instead that household B lives closest to the city center.  Figure 6 
illustrates how the required modification of the Edgeworth box is the mirror image of that 
just described.  Household B’s origin is now the point  ) , ( C l .  The top of the box is 
simply a horizontal line segment of width l.  The height of the right side of the box is the 
total amount of composite good available, C.  The bottom of the box is a line that 
identifies how much composite good remains to be divided between households A and B 
after household A commutes to the city center.  The distance household A commutes is 
equal to the length of household B’s lot, 
B s .  Thus, the bottom of the box is the line 
B ts .  
Finally, household A’s origin is the point  ) , 0 ( tl , where tl  is the amount of composite 
good that remains if  l s
B =  and household A commutes the entire length of the city.  In 
this case, the bottom of the box has “rotated up” by 
B ts , so household A’s indifference 
curves must also be “rotated up” the same way.  Household B’s indifference curves are 
unchanged.  A point in this modified Edgeworth box identifies an allocation in which 
household B lives closest to the city center and is the same as described in the previous 
case except that 
B x  is at the city center and 
A x  is at 
B s + 0.    
The set of tangencies, or the contract curve, will characterize interior Pareto 
optima, just as in the standard Edgeworth box.  Again, it is useful to characterize the 
contract curve in terms of marginal rates of substitution.  Let  R R MRS
i → +
2 : b e  




s i i i
MU
MU
z s MRS = ) , (   12
identifies how much composite good household i is willing to give up for an additional 
piece of land, given that it is already consuming the bundle  ) , (
i i z s .  When household A 
lives closest to the city center, a feasible allocation  ) , , , , , (
B A B A B A x x z z s s  is on the 
contract curve if  t z s MRS z s MRS
B B B A A A + = ) , ( ) , (  and 
B A s s < .  We add t to 
) , (
B B B z s MRS  because we rotate household B’s indifference curves down, just as we 
rotated the top of the box down to account for composite good used in commuting.  
Alternatively, when household B lives closest to the city center, a feasible allocation 
) , , , , , (
B A B A B A x x z z s s  is on the contract curve if  t z s MRS z s MRS
A A A B B B + = ) , ( ) , (  and 
A B s s < .  As a result, the contract curve may be disconnected, as in Figure 7.  Since we 
know that the household living closest to the city center can enjoy a level of utility no 
higher than the household living farther away from the city center, we know that both 
households are equally well off at the ends of both pieces of the contract curve and, in 
fact, enjoy the same level of utility.  For example, in Figure 7, let h identify the 
allocation ) , , , , , (
B A B A B A x x z z s s , which is the endpoint of the contract curve when 
household A lives closest to the city center, and let k  identify the allocation 
) ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ (
B A B A B A x x z z s s , which is the endpoint of the contract curve when household B 
lives closest to the city center.  Then  ) , ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( ) , (
B B B B B B A A A A A A z s U z s U z s U z s U = = = . 
The standard argument from microeconomic theory explaining why the contract 
curve characterizes Pareto optima applies here.  Given a feasible allocation on the curve, 
there is no alternative allocation in the modified Edgeworth box that makes one 
household better off without harming the other household.  Similarly, with convex 
preferences, interior Pareto optima occur at tangency points, on the contract curve.   13
The intuition for these first order conditions is new.  Consider an allocation 
) , , , , , (
B A B A B A x x z z s s  where  ) (
B A s s <  and  t z s MRS z s MRS
B B B A A A + > ) , ( ) , ( .  Then we 
could expand household A’s parcel a little, shrink household B’s parcel a little to keep the 
allocation feasible, and transfer some composite good from household A to B, while 
covering the additional commuting cost.  Such an operation could make both households 
better off, contradicting the optimality of the original allocation.  Similarly, if 
t z s MRS z s MRS
B B B A A A + < ) , ( ) , ( , then we could shrink household A’s parcel, expand 
household B’s parcel, save on commuting cost, and transfer composite good to household 
A, making both households better off.  Thus, at any efficient allocation with 
B A s s < , 
t z s MRS z s MRS B B B A A A + = ) , ( ) , ( . 
The final intuition comes from Figure 5 and calculus.  To account for commuting 
cost, household B’s indifference curves are rotated down by 
A ts C − .  As we have defined 
marginal rates of substitution to be non-negative, the condition characterizing tangencies 
in the figure is actually  
t z s MRS z s MRS
B B B A A A − − = − ) , ( ) , (.  
The right hand side follows from the application of calculus to the rotation.  The first 
order condition follows immediately from this equation. 
 
Equilibrium 
To explore equilibrium, we need to identify who is endowed with the land and 
composite good available in the economy.  Let 
i ω  be household i’s endowment of 
composite good.  We assume that households are endowed with all the composite good 
available in the economy, so  C
B A = +ω ω .  For simplicity, households are not endowed   14
with land.  Rather, we introduce an absentee landlord who is endowed with all the land in 
the economy.  The landlord does not like to consume land in the city but does like to 
consume the composite good, so 
L L L L z z s U = ) , (.  
Adding the landlord to the model necessitates adjusting our definitions of an 
allocation and of feasibility.  Now, an allocation is a list  ) , , , , , , (
L B A B A B A z x x z z s s , which 
is feasible if 
C tx tx z z z
B A L B A = + + + + , 
0 ) , [ ) , [ / = + ∩ +
B B B A A A s x x s x x , 
and 
) , 0 [ ) , [ ) , [ l s x x s x x
B B B A A A = + ∪ + . 
The definition of a Pareto optimum is the same. 
  Let the composite consumption good be the numeraire.  Let P be the land price 
function, where  ) (V P is the price of parcel  ) , 0 [ l V ⊂ .  We would like the price of land to 
satisfy “no arbitrage,” so we would like it to be additive across land parcels.  In other 
words, if V and W are two parcels of land such that  0 / = ∩W V , then 
) ( ) ( ) ( W V P W P V P ∪ = + .  Let  + → R l p ) , 0 [ :  be a density function.  A land price 
function P such that  ∫ =
V dx x p V P ) ( ) (  satisfies this criterion. 
If ) , , , , , , (
L B A B A B A z x x z z s s  is a feasible allocation and  p  is a price density, then 





x dx x p ) (  for parcel  ) , [






x dx x p ) (  for parcel  ) , [
B B B s x x + .  Since 
0 ) , [ ) , [ / = + ∩ +
B B B A A A s x x s x x    15
and 
) , 0 [ ) , [ ) , [ l s x x s x x
B B B A A A = + ∪ + , 
the landlord receives 
∫ ∫ ∫ = +
+ + l s x
x
s x




A 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( 
units of composite good from the sale of land, so  ∫ =
l L dx x p z
0 ) ( . 
  Now we are ready to define a competitive equilibrium.  Composite consumption 
good is again the numeraire.  A competitive equilibrium is a feasible allocation 
) , , , , , , (
* * * * * * * L B A B A B A z x x z z s s  and a price density 
* p  such that 
1.  ) , (
* * A A z s  maximizes household A’s utility subject to its budget constraint,  
A A s x
x
A tx dx x p z
A A
A ω ≤ + +∫
+
) (
* , and 
2.  ) , (
* * B B z s  maximizes household B’s utility subject to its budget constraint 
B B s x
x
B tx dx x p z
B B




  Since utility functions are increasing in both arguments, budget constraints will 
hold with equality.  Substituting for 
A z  and 
B z  in the respective households’ 
maximization problems, the first order conditions for maximizing utility over driveway 
locations and land consumption are, for i = A,B,  
) ( ) , (
i i i i i s x p z s MRS + =  
and 
t x p s x p
i i i − = + ) ( ) (.  
The intuition for these expressions is as follows.  Adding land at the back of a parcel 
causes no change in commuting costs, so at a household optimum, the willingness to pay   16
for an additional unit of land at the back is equal to its cost.  Notice that this condition is 
analogous to the first order condition for equilibrium in the standard Edgeworth box.  
Adding a unit of land at the front of a parcel reduces commuting cost by t, so at a 
household optimum, adding a unit at the front must cost t more than adding a unit to the 
back.  Otherwise, the household would choose a different parcel at a household optimum. 
  Since there are three agents in this economy, we cannot illustrate equilibrium 
allocations using an Edgeworth box.  We can, however, illustrate equilibrium price 
densities.  Suppose that  ) , , , , , , (
* * * * * * * L B A B A B A z x x z z s s  is an equilibrium allocation with 
household A living closest to the city center.  Let  ) , (
* * A A A A z s MRS p =  and let 
) , (
























is an equilibrium price density.  See Panel A of Figure 8, where the horizontal axis is 
location and the vertical axis is price.  However, since 
B A MRS MRS > , household A will 
want to expand its lot and consume part of household B’s parcel.  So, this price density 
cannot be an equilibrium price density.   
What we need to do is to construct a price density so that household A cannot 
increase its utility by expanding its parcel, so it has no incentive to do so.  Let 
) , (
* * A A A A z s U U =  and let  ) , ( s U z
A  be the amount of composite good that household A 
must consume to enjoy that same utility level, 
A U , given that it is consuming s  units of 
land, where s  may not be equal to 
A s
* .  Let s ˆ be such that 
B A A p s U z s MRS = )) ˆ , ( , ˆ (.   
See Panel B of Figure 8.  Then household A will be indifferent between the parcel 
) , [
* * * A A A s x x +  and a slightly larger parcel if the price density is adjusted so that   17
)) , ( , ( ) ( x U z x MRS x p
A A =  for  s x s
A ˆ
* < ≤ .  In addition, household B will have no desire 
to expand its parcel in towards the city center.  Thus, 

































is an equilibrium price density.  Alternatively, let  ) , (
* * B B B z s U U =  and let  ) , ( s U z
B  be 
the quantity of composite good household B must consume to enjoy utility level 
B U , 
given that it is consuming s  units of land.  Let s ~be such that 
A B B p s U z s MRS = )) ~ , ( , ~ (.   
Then 





















is also an equilibrium price density.  See Panel C of Figure 8.  Indeed, any price density 
that “falls between” the two is also an equilibrium price density, so there is a continuum 
of equilibria.  The landlord likes the last one best, since that one generates the highest 
rent collection. 
 
Welfare Properties Of Equilibrium Allocations 
  Two features of this model are that equilibrium allocations are Pareto optima, so 
there is a valid First Welfare Theorem (Berliant and Fujita 1992), and for every Pareto 
optimal allocation, there exists a land price density and endowments such that the Pareto 
optimal allocation is an equilibrium allocation with respect to that land price density and 
endowments, so there is also a valid Second Welfare Theorem (Berliant and Fujita 1992).    18
Intuitively, this can be seen from the first order conditions.  If household A is located 
closer to the city center, then the first order conditions for equilibrium imply 
) ( ) ( ) , ( l p s x p z s MRS
B B B B B = + = , 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) , (
B A A A A A A x p s p s x p z s MRS = = + = , 
and  
t x p s x p
B B B − = + ) ( ) (.  
So,  t z s MRS z s MRS
A A A B B B − = ) , ( ) , ( , and this is the first order condition for Pareto 
optima.  The argument also works in the opposite direction.  An important implication is 
that Proposition 1 applies to any equilibrium allocation, so the predictions stated in 
Proposition 1 are potentially testable.  Moreover, in equilibrium, the consumer with 
higher income must naturally end up with higher utility.  Thus, in equilibrium, the order 




  Consider a linear city of length l = 8.  Let household A be endowed with 58 units 
of composite good and let household B be endowed with 154 units of composite good, so 
C = 212.  The transportation cost of commuting per unit of distance is t = 8.  Suppose that 
household A’s utility function is 
2 ) 16 ( ) , (
A A A A A s z z s U − − =  and household B’s utility 
function is 
2 ) 16 ( ) , (
B B B B B s z z s U − − = .  For household A, the marginal utility of land at 
a bundle  ) , (
A A z s is ) 16 ( 2
A s − , while the marginal utility of composite good at a bundle 
) , (
A A z s  is always 1.  Similarly, household B’s marginal utility of land at a bundle   19
) , (
B B z s is ) 16 ( 2
B s − , while the marginal utility of composite good at a bundle  ) , (
B B z s  is 
always 1.  (For those who know calculus, recall that the marginal utility of land is the 
derivative of the utility function with respect to land, and similarly for the composite 
good.)  The marginal rate of substitution for land in terms of composite good at a bundle 
is the ratio of the marginal utilities at that bundle, so for household A, 
) 16 ( 2 ) , (
A A A A s z s MRS − = , and for household B,  ) 16 ( 2 ) , (
B B B B s z s MRS − = . 
  What does the set of Pareto optima look like in this model?  First, we will identify 
the part of the contract curve such that household A lives closest to the city center.  We 
can find this part of the curve by setting  t z s MRS z s MRS
B B B A A A + = ) , ( ) , (,  w h i c h  
implies that  t s s
B A + − = − ) 16 ( 2 ) 16 ( 2 .  Since t = 8 and 
A B s s − =8 , we can see that 
8 )) 8 ( 16 ( 2 ) 16 ( 2 + − − = −
A A s s .  Solving for 
A s , we find that  2 =
A s
D .  It follows that 
6 2 8 = − =
B s
D .  When household A lives closest to the city center, its utility level must 
be less than or equal to household B’s utility level, which implies that 
2 2 ) 6 16 ( ) 2 16 ( − − ≤ − −
B A z z
D D .  We know that 
A A A A B z z z ts C z
D D D D − = − ⋅ − = − − = 196 2 8 212 . 
Substituting for 
B z
D , it follows that  146 ≤
A z
D .  Thus, when household A lives closest to 
the city center, the set of Pareto optima is the union of the two line segments [(0,0), (2,0)] 
and [(2,0), (2, 146)].  See Figure 9.  Since the two households have identical utility 
functions, we know by symmetry that when household B lives closest to the city center 
2 =
B s
D , 6 =
A s
D , and  146 ≤
B z
D .  When household B lives closest to the city center, the 
contract curve is the union of the two line segments [(6,66), (6, 212)] and [(6, 212), (8, 
212)].  See Figure 9.   20
Next, we will construct an equilibrium price density for this model.  Since both 
the First and Second Welfare Theorems are valid for this model, the only candidates for 
equilibrium allocations are the Pareto optimal allocations.  Since household A has less 
endowed wealth than household B, in the end it will have lower utility than household B.  
It follows from Proposition 1 that household A lives closest to the city center.  We want 
to construct a land price density such that neither household can increase its utility by 
deviating from an allocation such that  0
* =
A x , 2
* =
A s , 2
* =
B x , and  6
* =
B s .  On the 
margin, the price that household A pays for land should be equal to its marginal 
willingness to pay for land, which implies that 
28 ) 2 16 ( 2 ) 16 ( 2 ) 2 (
* * = − = − = =
A A s MRS p . 
Similarly, on the margin, the price that household B pays for land should be equal to its 
marginal willingness to pay for land, so 
20 ) 6 16 ( 2 ) 16 ( 2 ) 8 (
* * = − = − = =
B B s MRS p . 
Notice that the difference between the two is equal to the cost of commuting per unit 
distance.  Next, we need to price land at  2 > x  such that household A cannot make itself 
better off by increasing the size of its lot, while keeping its lot front at the origin.  In other 
words, if household A consumes more land, it should have to give up so much composite 
good that it does not increase its utility.  This quantity is revealed by 
A MRS , so 
) 16 ( 2 ) (
* x x p − ≥ .  Notice that when  6 = x ,  20 ) 16 ( 2 = − x , and for  6 > x ,  20 ) 16 ( 2 < − x .  
If we set  20 ) (
* = x p  for  8 6 ≤ < x , then the condition that  ) 16 ( 2 ) (
* x x p − ≥  is satisfied, 
as is the condition that  20 ) 8 (
* = p .  So, an equilibrium price density is 





















x x p . 
This price density is illustrated in Figure 10. 
Finally, we will construct the equilibrium allocation associated with this land 
price density.  Since the equilibrium land price density constructed above supports an 
allocation such that  0
* =
A x ,  2
* =
A s ,  2
* =
B x , and  6
* =
B s , we just need to figure out 
how much composite good everyone consumes. 
  Household A’s expenditure on land is  







* = ⋅ = = = ∫ ∫ ∫
+





which is the area labeled A in Figure 10.  Household A’s utility is increasing in land and 
composite good, so it exhausts its budget and consumes 
2 56 58 ) (
* *
*






A A A dx x p tx z ω . 
Household B’s expenditure on land, the area labeled B in Figure 10, is 









* = + = + − = = ∫∫ ∫ ∫
+





and its expenditure on commuting is  16 2 8
* = ⋅ =
B tx .  Since household B also spends all 
of its income, 
2 136 16 154 ) (
* *
*






B B B dx x p tx z ω . 
Finally, the absentee landlord collects both households’ expenditures on land in 
composite good, so  192 136 56
* = + =
L z .  So, an equilibrium allocation associated with 
the price density 
* p  is  ) 192 , 2 , 0 , 2 , 2 , 6 , 2 ( ) , , , , , , (
* * * * * * * =
L B A B A B A z x x z z s s .  Alternative   22




We have presented in this essay the simplest model of how two households 
distribute themselves across space and shown that they do so efficiently.  Using the 
welfare theorems and Proposition 1, we can characterize the relationship between 
household income, the size of the lot the household occupies, and the location of the lot.  
In equilibrium, the household with the larger endowment of composite commodity will 
ultimately enjoy a higher level of utility, and so will live further away from the city 
center and on a larger lot than the household with the smaller endowment of composite 
commodity.  This was, in fact, the outcome of our specific example.  The Alonso model 
can also accommodate n identical households, where n is finite and greater than two.  
Under certain conditions, Fujita (1989) can be used to show that the model can also 
accommodate n heterogeneous households. 
An important implication of this model is that equilibrium allocations are 
efficient, so there is no market failure.  Thus, under the assumption of perfect 
competition, the free market yields efficiency, as it does in similar analyses of non-
locational goods.   
   23
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